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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
C.H. Robinson Company ("CHR") appeals from the district 
court's order of November 7, 1997, denying its motion to 
exclude certain suppliers of perishable agricultural 
commodities ("produce") from the universe of unpaid 
suppliers entitled to recover benefits under the statutory 
trust created by the Perishable Agricultural Commodities 
Act, 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c). CHR intervened in this action filed 
by Idahoan Fresh ("Idahoan") against Advantage Produce, 
Inc. ("Advantage") to enforce the trust and challenged 
Idahoan's proposed schedule of qualified claimants under 
the trust. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 
S 499e(c)(5). We have jurisdiction over the district court's 
interlocutory order denying the exclusion of Idahoan and 
Alsum Produce, Inc. ("Alsum") as qualified beneficiaries 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) as the district court 
certified the order of November 7, 1997, for immediate 
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appeal and we granted CHR's Petition for Permission to 
Appeal. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework of Perishabl e 
Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 
 
We begin with a brief overview of the Perishable 
Agricultural Commodities Act ("PACA"). In 1930, Congress 
enacted PACA to promote fair trading practices in the 
produce industry. See 7 U.S.C. S 499a et seq.; Consumers 
Produce Co. v. Volante Wholesale Produce, Inc., 16 F.3d 
1374, 1377 (3d Cir. 1993). In particular, Congress intended 
PACA to protect small farmers and growers who were 
vulnerable to the practices of financially irresponsible 
buyers.1 See Hull Co. v. Hauser's Foods, Inc., 924 F.2d 777, 
780 (8th Cir. 1991). Under PACA, it is unlawful for buyers 
of produce, inter alia, to fail to make prompt payment for a 
shipment of produce. See 7 U.S.C. S 499b(4). A buyer's 
failure to tender prompt payment triggers civil liability and 
the possible revocation of the buyer's PACA license required 
by 7 U.S.C. S 499c. See 7 U.S.C. SS 499e(a), 449h(a). 
Prompt payment is defined by regulations which apply 
unless the parties agree otherwise in writing prior to the 
transaction. See 7 C.F.R. S 46.2(aa). 
 
In 1984, Congress amended PACA to protect further 
certain unpaid suppliers2 of produce by including a 
statutory trust provision which provides an additional 
remedy for sellers against a buyer failing to make prompt 
payment. See P.L. 98-273; H.R. Rep. No. 98-543, at 2 
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 405, 406. Prior to 
this amendment, unpaid produce suppliers were unsecured 
creditors vulnerable to the buyers' practice of granting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The statute and regulations speak in terms of "commission merchant, 
dealer and broker." See 7 U.S.C. S 499a et seq. For ease of reference, we 
refer to these participants as "buyers." 
 
2. The statute and regulations use the terms "supplier, seller, or agent." 
This opinion refers to the these participants interchangeably as suppliers 
or sellers. 
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other creditors a security interest in their inventory and 
accounts receivable. See Tom Lange Co. v. Lombardo Fruit 
& Produce Co. (In re Lombardo Fruit & Produce Co.), 12 F.3d 
806, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-543, at 
3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 405, 407). Under 
the 1984 provision, a buyer's produce, products derived 
from that produce, and the proceeds gained therefrom are 
held in a non-segregated, floating trust for the benefit of 
unpaid suppliers who have met the applicable statutory 
requirements. See 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c); 7 C.F.R. S 46.46(b). 
Thus, the provision gives certain unpaid sellers of produce 
an interest in the PACA trust assets superior to that of a 
perfected, secured creditor. See Consumers Produce, 16 
F.3d at 1379. In a 1995 amendment to PACA, which we 
discuss below, Congress made procedural changes in the 
trust fund provisions. See P.L. 104-48,S 6, 7 U.S.C. 
S 499e(c)(4). 
 
To enforce its rights under the statutory trust, a qualified 
beneficiary may file a claim in the district court 
immediately upon the buyer's failure to tender prompt 
payment. See 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(5). A qualified unpaid seller 
remains entitled to benefits until paid in full. See 7 C.F.R. 
S 46.46(c)(1). A seller eligible for the statutory trust benefits 
must preserve its rights by satisfying a notice requirement 
by either sending notice to the buyer within 30 days of a 
payment default or, as provided in the 1995 amendment to 
PACA, including a statutory statement referencing the trust 
on its invoices. See 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3), (4); 7 C.F.R. 
S 46.46(c), (f). While a seller may agree in writing to a 
payment period other than that defined in the regulations 
as prompt, an unpaid seller loses its right to participate in 
the trust if it agrees in writing to extend the payment period 
beyond 30 days. See 7 C.F.R. S 46.46(e)(2). The issue 
presented by this appeal is whether a seller also forfeits its 
right to participate in the PACA trust if it fails to reduce to 
writing an agreement to extend the payment term. 
 
B. Current Dispute 
 
Over a period of several months, Advantage purchased 
produce from Idahoan, CHR, Alsum, O.P. Murphy & Sons 
("Murphy"), and Powerhouse Produce, L.L.C. 
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("Powerhouse"). The details of these transactions are not in 
dispute.3 
 
In a series of transactions from August 7, 1996, through 
December 28, 1996, Idahoan sold a total of $116,684.26 
worth of produce on credit to Advantage. See app. 9.4 All of 
Idahoan's invoices to Advantage contain the language 
required under 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(4), the 1995 PACA 
amendment, to notify the buyer that the seller intends to 
preserve its trust claim against the buyer. Idahoan and 
Advantage did not enter into a written agreement extending 
the payment term which, in this case, in the absence of a 
written agreement altering the term, is ten days. See 7 
C.F.R. S 46.2(aa)(5). However, William Carson, president of 
Advantage, alleges that they had an oral agreement 
extending the payment term to 20 days. Additionally, 28 of 
the 30 outstanding invoices issued by Idahoan to 
Advantage stated "PAYMENT TERMS: Net 20 days." The 
remaining two invoices contain no payment term. 
 
Alsum sold, on credit, a total of $10,708.00 worth of 
produce to Advantage in two transactions on October 9 and 
24, 1996. Alsum and Advantage did not enter into a written 
agreement extending the payment term. As with Idahoan, 
Carson claims that Alsum and Advantage had an oral 
agreement to extend the term, though in Alsum's case the 
extended term was 15 rather than 20 days. 
Notwithstanding the oral agreement, both of Alsum's 
unpaid invoices state "PAYMENT TERMS: NET 10." Both 
invoices also contain the statutory language as provided in 
the 1995 PACA amendment notifying Advantage that Alsum 
intended to preserve its PACA trust claim. 
 
CHR sold $36,004.80 worth of produce to Advantage 
pursuant to their written agreement to extend the payment 
term to 30 days. CHR's invoices for these sales included a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because there seems to be no dispute that Murphy and Powerhouse 
are qualified PACA trust beneficiaries, we need not be concerned with 
the details of their transactions with Advantage. Our discussion of the 
facts therefore is limited to Advantage's transactions with Alsum, 
Idahoan, and CHR. 
 
4. Citations to the appendix refer to the tab number because the pages 
of the Appendix are not numbered continuously. 
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payment term of 30 days as well as the statutory language 
required to preserve its interest in the PACA trust. See app. 
5. 
 
Advantage failed to pay Idahoan, Alsum, and CHR the 
amounts due on these outstanding invoices. On February 
10, 1997, Idahoan filed a complaint against Advantage and 
its officers, William Carson and William Carson III, for 
damages and injunctive relief alleging violations of PACA 
based upon Advantage's failure to pay its invoices and 
breach of the statutory trust. The district court issued a 
temporary restraining order on February 11, 1997, 
enjoining the defendants from further dissipating the 
constructive trust imposed by 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c). On 
February 20, 1997, Idahoan and Advantage filed a 
Stipulated Order for Preliminary Injunction which stated a 
procedure for identifying all of Advantage's qualified and 
unpaid PACA trust creditors. 
 
CHR intervened as a party plaintiff in the action on May 
27, 1997. See app. 5. On June 2, 1997, Idahoan and 
Advantage filed a Joint Status Report and Motion for an 
Order for the Distribution of PACA Trust Proceeds ("Joint 
Motion") identifying the following universe of qualified PACA 
trust creditors: 
 
       Idahoan                 $ 116,684.26 
       CHR                        36,004.80 
       Murphy                      4,300.00 
       Alsum                      10,708.00 
       Powerhouse                  4,868.00 
                               ____________     
                               $ 172,565.06 
 
App. 6. 
 
Although CHR was a party to the action at the time 
Advantage and Idahoan filed the Joint Motion, they did not 
consult CHR or invite CHR to join in the Joint Motion. On 
June 5, 1997, CHR filed an objection to the Joint Motion 
and served discovery requests upon Advantage seeking 
documents which established the alleged qualified status of 
the creditors set forth in the Joint Motion. See app. 7. CHR 
then filed a Motion to Exclude Alsum and Idahoan from the 
universe of qualified PACA trust creditors on the grounds 
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that they failed to comply with the statute and regulations. 
In particular, CHR argued that Idahoan and Alsum orally 
agreed to extend the payment term beyond the ten-day 
period established in the regulations, and they were, 
therefore, not qualified PACA trust creditors because the 
agreements were not reduced to writing prior to the 
transaction. See app. 9. 
 
At the time of briefing on this appeal, the total amount of 
available PACA trust funds was approximately $45,000.00. 
See Br. for Appellant at 5. If Idahoan and Alsum are 
excluded from the universe of qualified trust beneficiaries, 
the total qualified and unpaid trust claims would be 
$45,172.80. Thus, their exclusion would result in payment 
virtually in full, rather than a small pro-rata portion, to the 
qualified PACA trust creditors, CHR, Powerhouse, and 
Murphy. 
 
On November 7, 1997, the district court issued an order 
denying CHR's Motion to Exclude Idahoan and Alsum citing 
"the reasons stated of record at the argument of the 
motion." App. 12. Following argument on CHR's motion to 
exclude, the district court stated that an oral agreement to 
extend a payment term is totally ineffective and, provided 
that the supplier complies with the notice provisions of the 
statute, it is a qualified PACA trust beneficiary. See Br. for 
Appellee, Attach. at 11-12.5 Thereafter, CHR filed a motion 
for reconsideration or, in the alternative, certification 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). On December 1, 1997, the 
district court certified the November 7, 1997 order, for 
immediate appeal, the controlling question of law being 
whether Idahoan and Alsum "perfected their trust claims 
under PACA." On February 19, 1998, we granted CHR's 
Petition for Permission to Appeal. See app. 1, 14. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
CHR contends that the district court erred in finding that 
Idahoan and Alsum were qualified to receive statutory 
benefits under PACA. According to CHR, the plain 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. A partial transcript of the argument is included as an Attachment to 
the Brief for the Appellee, Idahoan. 
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language, legislative history, and purposes of the statute 
and regulations lead to the conclusion that a seller forfeits 
its right to PACA trust benefits if it orally agrees to extend 
the payment term beyond that established in the 
regulations as prompt, in this case, ten days. 
 
There is no dispute that Idahoan and Alsum did not 
reduce to writing their agreements to extend the payment 
period in their transactions with Advantage. There is also 
no dispute that Idahoan's and Alsum's invoices properly 
notified Advantage of their intent to preserve their right to 
statutory benefits under 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(4). Thus, as we 
have indicated, this appeal raises the following issue 
regarding the proper interpretation of PACA: whether an 
agreement to extend the payment term beyond the time 
defined by the regulations as prompt must be in writing in 
order for the seller to qualify for the benefits of the PACA 
trust. Because this appeal concerns solely the legal issue of 
the proper interpretation of statutes and regulations, we 
exercise de novo review over the district court's order. See 
Shell Oil Co. v. Babbit, 125 F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
We initially point out that certain general precepts guide 
us on this appeal. The role of the courts in interpreting a 
statute is to give effect to Congress's intent. See Negonsott 
v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104, 113 S.Ct. 1119, 1122-23 
(1993). Because it is presumed that Congress expresses its 
intent through the ordinary meaning of its language, every 
exercise of statutory interpretation begins with plain 
language of the statute itself. See Santa Fe Med. Servs., Inc. 
v. Segal (In re Segal), 57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 588, 109 S.Ct. 
2023, 2028 (1989)); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 
903 (3d Cir. 1994). Where the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, further inquiry is not required, except in 
the extraordinary case where a literal reading of the 
language produces an absurd result. See In re Segal, 57 
F.3d at 346. Moreover, a court may depart from the plain 
language of a statute only by an extraordinary showing of 
a contrary congressional intent in the legislative history. 
See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75, 105 S.Ct. 479, 
482 (1984). 
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In interpreting a statute, courts should endeavor to give 
meaning to every word which Congress used and therefore 
should avoid an interpretation which renders an element of 
the language superfluous. See United States v. State of 
Alaska, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1888, 1918 (1997); United 
Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown 
Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 550, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 1533 
(1996) (reading which gives effect to all of a statute's 
provisions prevails over one which disregards a provision as 
legislative oversight); First Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. FDIC, 79 F.3d 
362, 367 (3d Cir. 1996); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Cohn (In 
re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1995). This basic 
tenet of statutory construction applies equally to the 
interpretation of regulations. See Silverman v. Eastich 
Multiple Investor Fund, LP, 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(dealing with canon that court should construe statutory 
language so that all provisions are given effect); LaVallee 
Northside Civic Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Coastal Zone 
Management Comm'n, 866 F.2d 616, 623 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(regulation which conflicts with statute under which it was 
promulgated is ineffective, but court should endeavor to 
reconcile the two). Thus, the preferred construction of a 
statute and its regulations is the one that gives meaning to 
all provisions. See United States v. Higgins, 128 F.3d 138, 
142 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
In addition to following these general canons of statutory 
construction, we are mindful that PACA, which was enacted 
to protect unpaid suppliers of produce and alleviate the 
burden of nonpayment on commerce, see 7 U.S.C. 
S 499e(c)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 98-543, at 3-4 (1983), reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 407, is remedial legislation which 
a court should construe broadly to effectuate its purpose. 
See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 88 S.Ct. 548, 
553 (1967); RNS Servs., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Mine 
Safety & Health Admin., 115 F.3d 182, 186-87 (3d Cir. 
1997); see also Hull, 924 F.2d at 782; Exportal LTDA. v. 
United States, 902 F.2d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Harry Klein 
Produce Corp. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 831 F.2d 403, 
405 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 
With these principles in mind, we begin our analysis with 
the statutory and regulatory language. The statute and 
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regulations refer, in numerous instances, to the 
requirement that an agreement to extend the prompt 
payment period be in writing. This appeal requires us to 
determine whether that requirement relates only to the 
enforceability of such an agreement or is a precondition to 
a seller's qualification for trust benefits. We turn first to the 
section of the statutory trust provision which refers to the 
writing requirement. 
 
The statutory trust provision provides that the produce, 
products derived from that produce, and any proceeds 
gained therefrom are held in trust by the buyer for the 
benefit of unpaid sellers until such sellers are paid in full. 
See 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(2). Two subsections condition this 
provision by requiring an unpaid seller to preserve its rights 
to the trust benefits by notifying the buyer of its intent to 
do so, 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3), which we discussfirst, and 7 
U.S.C. S 499(c)(4), which we discuss below. In the context of 
establishing this notice requirement, the statute refers to 
the mandate that an agreement must be in writing. In 
particular, the statute provides that 
 
       (3) The unpaid supplier . . . shall lose the benefits of 
       such trust unless such person has given written notice 
       of intent to preserve the benefits of the trust to the 
       [buyer] within thirty calendar days (i) after the 
       expiration of the time prescribed by which payment 
       must be made, as set forth in regulations issued by the 
       Secretary; [or] (ii) after expiration of such other time by 
       which payment must be made, as the parties have 
       expressly agreed to in writing before entering into the 
       transaction . . . . When the parties expressly agree to 
       a payment time period different from that established 
       by the Secretary, a copy of any such agreement shall 
       be filed in the records of each party to the transaction 
       and the terms of payment shall be disclosed on 
       invoices, accountings, and other documents relating to 
       the transaction. 
 
7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Section 499e(c)(3) also provides that proper notice may be given within 
30 days after the seller receives notice that the payment instrument 
presented by the buyer had been dishonored. See  7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3). 
The facts of the transactions in this case do not implicate this portion 
of 
the statute. 
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According to CHR, the plain language of section 
499e(c)(3), in particular Congress's use of the term"shall," 
unambiguously requires that an agreement to extend the 
payment term be in writing in order for the seller to 
preserve its PACA trust benefits. This reading overstates 
what the subsection requires. The statute provides that an 
unpaid seller "shall lose the benefits of such trust unless 
such person has given written notice of intent to preserve the 
benefits of such trust." 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3) (emphasis 
added). The remainder of that sentence establishes the time 
period in which such notice must be given. In the context 
of defining timely notification, the statute then provides 
that agreements to extend payment terms must be in 
writing and that parties shall maintain a copy of such an 
agreement and disclose the terms of the agreement on 
invoices and other documents relating to the transaction. 
See 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3); see also 7 C.F.R. S 46.2(aa)(11). 
 
Thus, Congress, using the verb "shall," unambiguously 
intended that a seller timely notify the buyer of its intent to 
preserve its rights to PACA trust benefits. The plain and 
unambiguous language of the section does not provide, 
however, that a written agreement is a precondition of 
being entitled to the statutory trust benefits. Rather, the 
requirement is relevant to assessing when prompt payment 
is due and therefore when notice is timely. 
 
The plain language of the regulations supports this 
reading of the statute. The regulations first mention the 
writing requirement in the context of defining prompt 
payment. As noted above, the regulations establish times 
for prompt payment for various scenarios. See 7 C.F.R. 
S 46.2(aa)(1) - (10); 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3). In this case, the 
regulations provide that, unless agreed otherwise in writing, 
prompt payment is defined as payment within ten days of 
the buyer's acceptance of the produce. See 7 C.F.R. 
S 46.2(aa)(5). The regulations also provide that 
 
       [p]arties who elect to use different times of payment 
       than those set forth [herein] must reduce their 
       agreement to writing before entering into the 
       transaction and maintain a copy of the agreement for 
       their records. If they have so agreed, then payment 
       within the agreed upon time shall constitute `full 
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       payment promptly': Provided, That the party claiming 
       the existence of such an agreement for time of payment 
       shall have the burden of proving it. 
 
7 C.F.R. S 46.2(aa)(11). This section unambiguously 
requires that an agreement to extend a payment term must 
be in writing prior to the transaction. 
 
The regulations concerning the statutory trust also refer 
to the writing requirement. In particular, the regulation 
provides that 
 
       [w]hen a seller, supplier or agent who has met the 
       eligibility requirements of paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) of 
       this section, transfers ownership, possession, or 
       control of goods to a commission merchant, dealer, or 
       broker, it automatically becomes eligible to participate 
       in the trust. Participants who preserve their rights to 
       benefits in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section 
       remain beneficiaries until they are paid in full. 
 
7 C.F.R. S 46.46(c)(1). Subsection (f) requires that the seller 
properly notify the buyer of its intent to preserve its PACA 
trust benefits. See 7 C.F.R. S 46.46(f).7 The "eligibility" 
requirements of paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) provide the 
following: 
 
       (e) Prompt payment and eligibility for trust benefits. 
 
       (1) The times for prompt accounting and prompt 
       payment are set out in S 46.2(z) and (aa). Parties who 
       elect to use different times for payment must reduce 
       their agreement to writing before entering into the 
       transaction and maintain a copy of their agreement for 
       their records, and the times of payment must be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. This regulation refers to the writing requirement in the same context, 
and virtually to the same extent, as 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3). In particular, 
the regulation provides that a seller's notice of an intent to preserve 
the 
right to PACA trust benefits is timely if given 30 days "[a]fter 
expiration 
of such other time by which payment must be made as the parties have 
expressly agreed to in writing before entering into the transaction, but 
not longer than [30 days]." 7 C.F.R. S 46.46(f)(2)(ii). We therefore 
conclude that this section's reference to the writing requirement has the 
same effect as that of 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3) discussed above. 
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       disclosed on invoices, accountings, and other 
       documents relating to the transaction. 
 
       (2) The maximum time for payment for a shipment to 
       which a seller, supplier, or agent can agree and still 
       qualify for coverage under the trust is 30 days after 
       receipt and acceptance of the commodities as defined 
       in S 46.2(dd) and paragraph (a)(1) of this section. 
 
7 C.F.R. S 46.46(e). As in the statute, section (e)(1) of this 
regulation discusses the writing requirement in the context 
of defining prompt payment for a given transaction. Section 
(e)(2) explicitly provides that a seller is disqualified from 
receiving trust benefits if it agrees to extend the payment 
term longer than 30 days from the buyer's acceptance of 
the produce. The existence of such an explicit 
disqualification supports our view that the writing 
requirement is not a prerequisite to eligibility to participate 
in the PACA trust. 
 
Under CHR's view, these regulations establish eligibility 
requirements separate from the notice requirement to 
preserve eligibility. CHR argues that the eligibility 
requirements for sellers who agree to payment terms 
beyond ten days are that such an agreement be reduced to 
writing, those terms be included on all invoices regarding 
the transaction, and that eligibility is lost if the parties 
agree to a payment term over 30 days. CHR asserts that 
these prerequisites do not apply where there is not an 
agreement to extend a payment term. The plain language 
does not support this interpretation. 
 
The plain language of the statute and regulations 
requires that an agreement establishing a "prompt 
payment" period other than that established in the 
regulations must be in writing. The plain language also 
provides that an unpaid seller loses its right to PACA trust 
benefits if (1) it does not timely notify the buyer of its intent 
to preserve that right or (2) it agrees to a payment period 
beyond 30 days. Because we liberally interpret PACA to 
further its remedial purposes of reducing the burden on 
commerce and protecting unpaid sellers, we find that the 
writing requirement relates to the enforceability of an 
agreement to extend a payment term, but does not 
disqualify an unpaid seller from receiving trust benefits. 
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Idahoan and Alsum satisfied the notice requirement by 
including the requisite language on the face of their 
invoices to Advantage, see 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(4), and neither 
party agreed to a payment period over 30 days.8 Their 
failure to reduce their oral agreements with respect to the 
payment term to writing does not disqualify them, and they 
therefore are entitled to share in a pro-rata distribution of 
the statutory trust res until they receive payment in full. 
 
In so holding, we join the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, the only other court of appeals of 
which we are aware which has addressed the precise issue 
presented by this appeal, in concluding that a supplier's 
failure to reduce to writing an agreement to extend the 
payment term does not disqualify that supplier as a PACA 
trust beneficiary. See Hull, 924 F.2d 777. In Hull, two 
unpaid wholesale distributors of produce, Hull & J.J. 
Distributing, instituted suit against a defunct retail grocery 
store, Hauser's, to enforce their PACA trust rights. See id. 
at 778. Some of the retail store's assets were seized by one 
of the store's secured creditors, Gateway, who held 
perfected security interests in all of the store's assets and 
inventory. See id. at 778. 
 
It was undisputed that Hull and J.J. Distributing 
supplied Hauser's with produce over several years and that 
during that time the two suppliers orally agreed to a 
payment period of 45 days and 30 days after delivery, 
respectively. See id. Hull's invoices to Hauser indicated this 
as the payment period, while J.J. Distributing's invoices did 
not indicate any payment term. See id. 
 
The district court held that Hull and J.J. Distributing 
were entitled to trust benefits for their unpaid invoices 
notwithstanding the fact that they had not reduced their 
payment term extensions to writing. See id. at 779. Finding 
that the two suppliers had given Hauser's sufficient 
notification of their intent to preserve their PACA trust 
rights, the district court held that while the plain language 
of the statute makes oral agreements extending the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We are not reaching the issue of what would happen if the oral 
extension provided for a payment period in excess of 30 days because 
that situation is not before us in this case. See 7 C.F.R. S 46.46(e)(2). 
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payment term unenforceable, it only disqualifies a supplier 
from trust benefits where the supplier enters into a written 
agreement to extend the payment term beyond 30 days. See 
id. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court,finding 
that "oral agreements have no effect on produce sellers' 
trust protection." Id. at 781. According to the court, a buyer 
who orally agrees to an extension of the payment term 
beyond ten days makes an arrangement to violate PACA's 
prompt payment provision. See id. at 782. The court found 
that 
 
       it would be incongruous to disregard oral agreements 
       for purposes of enforcing PACA but recognize them for 
       the purpose of voiding the sellers' protection under the 
       trust. Thus, notwithstanding the oral agreements, both 
       sellers retained the right to demand payment within 
       ten days and seek trust protection under PACA. 
 
Id. at 782.9 In concluding its discussion of this issue, the 
 
(Text continued on page 17) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has suggested 
a conflicting result in two subsequent decisions. See Tom Lange Co. v. 
Lombardo Fruit & Produce Co. (In re Lombardo Fruit & Produce Co.), 12 
F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1993) (hereinafter In re Lombardo II); Goldman 
Fruit & Produce Co. v. Lombardo Fruit & Produce Co.  (In re Lombardo 
Fruit & Produce Co.), 12 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1993) (hereinafter In re 
Lombardo I). These two cases concern disputes between two different 
produce suppliers and a single buyer. In both instances, the court held 
that the unpaid seller was not entitled to PACA trust benefits. See 12 
F.3d at 809; 12 F.3d at 113. 
 
In In re Lombardo I, although letters and the invoices indicated an 
extended payment period, there was no written agreement which 
complied with all respects of PACA and its regulations. See 12 F.3d at 
113. There was also evidence of an oral agreement to extend the 
payment term. In the absence of a valid written agreement under PACA 
to extend the payment term, the court first stated that it could not 
measure the timeliness of notice based upon the extended payment 
term. See id. Then the court rejected the supplier's argument that its 
notice to the buyer was within 30 days of the expiration of the payment 
period established in the regulations. The court held that 
 
       [t]he evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that the parties 
       had an agreement to extend the payment terms beyond the ten days 
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       in the regulations. Though this agreement is insufficient to 
preserve 
       Goldman's trust protection, it is a valid contract between the 
       parties. A predicate to the trust protection is the requirement 
that 
       payment is delinquent; having agreed to extend the payment period 
       beyond ten days, it would be incongruous to permit Goldman to now 
       claim that no agreement existed and that payment was therefore 
       due within ten days. 
 
Id. at 113 (citation omitted). 
 
In making this statement, the In re Lombardo I court cited the opinion 
in Bowlin & Son, Inc. v. San Joaquin Food Serv., Inc. (In re San Joaquin 
Food Serv., Inc.), 958 F.2d 938, 941 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992). Our reading of 
In re San Joaquin suggests that the In re Lombardo I court may have 
cited it for a proposition In re San Joaquin did not state. Furthermore, 
In re Lombardo I did not question Hull. In the circumstances, to the 
extent, if any, that the language in In re Lombardo I conflicts with Hull, 
we find it unpersuasive. 
 
In In re Lombardo II, the supplier and the buyer entered into a written 
agreement prior to the transaction to extend the payment term to 30 
days. See 12 F.3d at 809. This agreement complied with PACA and its 
regulations in all respects. See id. Thereafter, the parties modified the 
agreement in writing in such a manner that no longer complied with 
PACA. See id. Although the court does not explain this subsequent 
written agreement or explicitly state in what manner it no longer 
complied with PACA, the opinion suggests that the agreement extended 
the payment term beyond 30 days, for which PACA explicitly disqualifies 
a seller as a trust beneficiary. The court found that, at that time, "an 
agreement complying with PACA no longer existed. There being no 
written agreement complying with PACA, Lange is prohibited from 
claiming PACA's trust protection." Id. at 807 (footnote omitted). The 
court 
further stated that 
 
       PACA imposes a trust upon the funds held by delinquent 
       purchasers if a written agreement required payment within thirty 
       days of delivery. Thus, at the time trust protection is claimed, 
there 
       must exist a valid written agreement complying with PACA's terms. 
 
Id. at 809-10. 
 
This language could be read to imply that without a written agreement 
to extend the payment term, the seller is not entitled to trust benefits. 
Although we believe that such a result would be incorrect in light of the 
explicit holding to the contrary in Hull, we note the potential conflict 
as 
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court also noted that a liberal construction of the statute is 
appropriate because it is remedial legislation. See id. at 782.10 
 
CHR argues that Hull is not applicable to this case 
because it was decided prior to Congress's 1995 
amendment to the PACA statutory trust which, it argues, 
changed the statutory landscape. In 1995, Congress added 
section 499e(c)(4) which provides, as an alternative to the 
post-delinquency methods outlined in subsection 3, an 
invoicing method of notifying the buyer of a seller's intent 
to preserve its right to trust benefits. See 7 U.S.C. 
S 499e(c)(4). According to CHR, because there was no 
invoice-notification method under PACA at the time the 
court decided Hull, the payment terms were crucial to 
determining the timeliness of the notice. CHR asserts that 
the rationale of Hull is inapplicable to this case where the 
timeliness of the notice is irrelevant because the sellers 
complied with the invoice-notification provision. In essence, 
CHR asserts that our interpretation renders the writing 
requirement meaningless in cases such as this where the 
supplier invokes invoice notification. 
 
The purpose of the 1995 amendment was to remove the 
expense to the United States Department of Agriculture in 
administering the trust provisions. See H.R. Rep. No. 104- 
207, at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 453, 456. 
Under the 1995 amendment, a seller may satisfy the notice 
requirement by including on its regular invoicing 
documents a statutory statement indicating the intent to 
preserve its trust rights. See id. An invoice which serves as 
notice to preserve a seller's trust rights also must include 
"[t]he terms of the payment if they differ from prompt 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
we are unsure of the court's intentions. Of course, the court may have 
meant nothing more than that the trust protection was lost because the 
payment period was extended in writing beyond 30 days contrary to 7 
C.F.R. S 46.46(e)(2). If so, In re Lombardo II is not inconsistent with 
Hull 
which involved an oral extension by one seller to 45 days. 
 
10. We recognize that one of the suppliers in Hull agreed to a payment 
period of 45 days. As we have indicated, we are not reaching the issue 
of what would happen if the oral extension provided for a period in 
excess of 30 days. See n.8, supra. The Hull court did not distinguish 
between a 30-day and 45-day period. 
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payment set out in section 46.2(z) and (aa) of this part, and 
the parties have expressly agreed to such terms in writing 
before the affected transactions occur." 7 C.F.R. 
S 46.46(f)(3)(ii). The writing requirement therefore is not 
rendered superfluous under our interpretation of the 
statute where the seller invokes the invoice-notification 
provision. Rather, a written agreement to extend the 
payment period gives rise to the obligation to include the 
payment term on the invoice which serves as notice of the 
seller's intent to preserve it PACA rights. 
 
District courts in other circuits have followed, either 
implicitly or explicitly, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit's approach in Hull. See A & J Produce Corp. v. CIT 
Group/Factoring, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 651, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (holding that only a written agreement to extend a 
payment term beyond 30 days forfeits the seller's rights, so 
that in the absence of a written agreement otherwise, a 
seller is entitled to enforce its right to full payment against 
the buyer within ten days of delivery of the produce); 
Continental Fruit Co. v. Thomas J. Gatziolis & Co., 774 F. 
Supp. 449, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that evidence of a 
course of dealing between the parties accepting payment 
beyond 30 days does not forfeit an unpaid seller's right to 
statutory benefits); C.H. Robinson Co. v. B.H. Produce Co., 
723 F. Supp. 785, 797 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd sub nom., 
C.H. Robinson Co. v. Trust Co. Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 1311 
(11th Cir. 1992) (discussing the lack of a written agreement 
to extend the payment period only in reference to the 
timeliness of the notice). In each of these cases, there was 
no evidence of a prior written agreement to extend the 
payment term, yet the courts held that the unpaid sellers 
were entitled to PACA trust benefits if they notified the 
buyers within 40 days after the delivery of the produce, 
which is 30 days after the expiration of the ten-day prompt 
payment period established by the regulations. 
 
In addition, at least one court has described the PACA 
writing requirement for agreements to extend payment 
terms as being in the nature of a statute of frauds. See 
Debruyn Produce Co. v. Richmond Produce Co. (In re 
Richmond Produce Co.), 112 B.R. 364, 374 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1990). In In re Richmond, the court was faced with the 
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issue of whether certain notices were timely to preserve the 
sellers' rights to statutory trust benefits. Finding that 
certain letters satisfied the writing requirement and 
therefore validly extended the payment term, the court 
found that the notices sent were timely because they were 
sent within 30 days of the expiration of the extended 
payment period. In so holding, the court commented that 
 
       the purpose of the writing requirement is to preclude 
       uncertainties as to the applicable payment terms and 
       the resulting deadline for filing a PACA notice. Thus, 
       the provision at issue is in the nature of a statute of 
       frauds and serves the same purpose. This conclusion is 
       supported by the statutory requirement that both 
       parties maintain a copy of the agreement in their 
       records and that the terms of the payment be disclosed 
       on `invoices. . . .' 
 
Id. at 374 (citation omitted). Thus, the court viewed the 
writing requirement as relevant to assessing when prompt 
payment is due and not as a precondition to preserving 
statutory trust benefits. 
 
CHR urges this court to join those courts which have 
required strict compliance with the preconditions of the 
statutory trust.11 See,  e.g., Bowlin & Son, Inc. v. San 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Most of the case law considering whether strict or substantial 
compliance is necessary addresses the notice requirement. There is 
authority in support of both positions. Compare Anic, Inc. v. Chipwich, 
Inc. (In re Chipwich, Inc.), 165 B.R. 135, 136 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(requirements of notice to preserve trust must be complied with strictly 
such that wrong name on notice renders it ineffective); Blair Merriam 
Fresh Fruit & Produce Co. v. Clark (In re D.K.M.B., Inc.), 95 B.R. 774, 
779 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (requiring strict compliance with content of 
notice); In re Marvin Properties, Inc., 854 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 
1988) 
(requiring notice to be given by seller itself andfinding that the buyer's 
actual knowledge of the seller's intent was insufficient to preserve its 
statutory PACA trust benefits) with In re Richmond Produce Co., 112 B.R. 
364 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that substantial compliance with 
notice requirement is sufficient to preserve right to trust benefits such 
that early notification or notice lacking certain information is 
effective); 
Dubin v. Carlton Fruit Co. (In re Carlton Fruit Co.), 84 B.R. 810 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1988) (requiring substantial compliance with requirements for 
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Joaquin Food Serv., Inc. (In re San Joaquin Food Serv., Inc.), 
958 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring strict 
compliance with the clear mandate of Congress to include 
the payment term on an invoice); In re John DeFrancesco & 
Sons, Inc., 114 B.R. 335, 336 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) 
(requiring strict compliance with the preconditions of 
participation in trust benefits). But, this case presents the 
issue of whether the writing requirement is a precondition 
to qualification as a PACA trust beneficiary. Only if we 
answered that question positively would we be required to 
reach the issue of whether strict or substantial compliance 
with that requirement was necessary to preserve properly 
an unpaid seller's right to receive benefits. Having found 
that it is not and is rather only relevant to determining 
what constitutes prompt payment in a given transaction, 
we need not decide today whether strict compliance with 
the requirements of PACA trust eligibility is required. 
 
Nonetheless, we recognize that these cases support the 
interpretation urged by CHR. Although the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit has not addressed explicitly the 
precise issue presented by this appeal, its ruling on a 
similar issue suggests a conclusion other than the one we 
reach today. In In re San Joaquin the court held that a 
produce supplier was not entitled to PACA trust benefits 
where the invoices it issued to the buyer did not contain 
the payment term agreed upon by the two parties in writing 
prior to the transaction. See 958 F.2d 938. 
 
In In re San Joaquin, there was no dispute that the 
supplier gave the buyer timely notice of its intent to 
preserve its interest in the trust or that the agreement to 
extend the payment term was in writing. See id. at 939-40. 
Thus, the sole issue presented was whether the supplier's 
failure to include the payment term on the invoice forfeited 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
notice such that failure to include date of transaction, contract terms 
and amount due did not render notice ineffective to preserve benefits of 
the statutory trust); In re W.L. Bradley Co., 75 B.R. 505, 511 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that premature filing of notice under section 
499e(c)(3) was effective). Because there is no dispute that Alsum and 
Idahoan complied with the invoice-notice provision, we need not address 
this issue today. 
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its rights to the PACA trust. As discussed above, 7 U.S.C. 
S 499e(c)(3) requires that "[w]hen the parties expressly agree 
to a payment time period different from that established by 
the Secretary, a copy of any such agreement shall befiled 
in the record of each party to the transaction and the terms 
of payment shall be disclosed on invoices, accountings, and 
other documents relating to the transaction." (emphasis 
added). The In re San Joaquin court found that the 
provision relating to the disclosure of the payment terms on 
invoices was a requirement to preserve a supplier's trust 
rights. See id. at 940. The court found that because this 
was a clear mandate of Congress as expressed in 
unambiguous statutory terms, sellers must comply strictly 
with it to receive trust benefits. See id. 
 
It is possible that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit also would hold that the requirement of a written 
agreement to extend the payment term beyond the period 
prescribed in the regulations is a prerequisite to preserving 
a supplier's rights to PACA trust benefits. After all, that 
requirement is in the same clause in 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(3) 
as the requirement that extended payment terms be 
indicated on invoices. 
 
In re John DeFrancesco & Sons, Inc., 114 B.R. 335, also 
is inconsistent with the interpretation of PACA that we have 
adopted. The court held that 
 
       in order to preserve its PACA trust benefits under the 
       statute, [the seller] must prove that it strictly complied 
       with all the necessary statutory requirements. By not 
       offering evidence of an agreement in writing before the 
       transaction was entered into, [the seller] fails to meet 
       its burden of proof that it strictly complied with the 
       statute. 
 
114 B.R. at 338 (citing In re Lombardo, 106 B.R. 593 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989)). Thus, the court implicitly held 
that the writing requirement is a precondition to eligibility 
as a trust beneficiary with which sellers must comply 
strictly. 
 
As discussed above, under our reading of the statute and 
the regulations, the plain language does not support the 
result reached by these cases. Guided as we must by the 
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plain language, we therefore find them unpersuasive. 
Moreover, a departure from the plain meaning of PACA is 
not warranted because we find no extraordinary showing of 
congressional intent otherwise in the legislative history. On 
the contrary, the legislative history supports our reading of 
PACA and its regulations. Like the statute and the 
regulations, the legislative history explicitly refers to two 
requirements for an unpaid supplier to qualify for trust 
benefits: (1) that the seller notify the buyer of its intention 
to preserve its rights and (2) that an agreement to extend 
the payment period not be beyond a reasonable time. See, 
e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 98-543, at 4 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 407-08 ("[T]he unpaid seller must accept 
the burden to preserve the trust by notifying both the 
Secretary and the commission merchant, dealer or broker 
within 30 days after expiration of the prompt payment date 
or date on which a payment instrument has been 
dishonored, or the trust benefits will be lost."); id. at 7, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 410 ("[T]he committee 
does not intend the trust to apply to any credit transaction 
that extends beyond a reasonable period. . . . [T]he 
secretary is required to establish, through rulemaking, the 
time by which, the parties to a transaction must agree 
payment on a transaction must be made, to qualify it for 
coverage under the trust. An agreement for payment after 
such time will not be eligible to receive the benefits of the 
trust."); 49 Fed. Reg. 45735, 45739 (1984) ("The legislation 
is clear that an absolute precondition to pursuing trust 
assets held by a defaulting buyer or receiver is thefiling of 
a written notice by the seller, supplier or agent after a 
failure to pay within the prescribed periods has elapsed."). 
 
Finally, we reject CHR's argument that requiring strict 
compliance with the writing requirement, such that a seller 
loses it right to statutory benefits if an agreement to extend 
the payment term is not reduced to writing, furthers the 
purposes of the statutory scheme. According to CHR, 
interpreting the writing requirement as a precondition to 
receiving trust benefits furthers the purposes of PACA by 
construing the trust to protect only those sellers who 
conduct their business in such a manner that complies 
with PACA and encourages prompt payment. Thus, CHR 
urges that "permitting sellers to orally extend payment 
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terms without adverse effect on trust eligibility would result 
in, and in fact already resulted in, practices by sellers 
which are in direct contravention of the PACA and its 
purpose." Br. at 23. 
 
PACA makes a buyer's failure to tender prompt payment 
a violation, but it does not make a seller's failure to 
demand prompt payment a violation. After all, PACA does 
not preclude a seller from agreeing in writing to a payment 
term beyond 30 days, but only disqualifies such a seller 
from participating in the trust.12 See 7 C.F.R. SS 46.2 
(aa)(11), 46.46(e)(2). 
 
We recognize that, in instances such as the one 
presented here, our interpretation places those sellers who 
reduce to writing agreements to extend payment terms in 
no better position than those who do not. Nevertheless, 
because Congress established the PACA trust to protect 
unpaid sellers against buyers' failure to make prompt 
payment and their subordination of the sellers' claim to 
secured creditors, we believe that our interpretation 
furthers the statutory purpose. The primary purpose of the 
statute was to protect unpaid sellers vis-a-vis secured 
creditors, not to prefer certain unpaid sellers over others. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order denying CHR's motion to exclude Idahoan and 
Alsum from the universe of those qualified to receive trust 
benefits in this case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In urging this court not to follow Hull, CHR argues that the court 
failed to sanction sellers who do not conduct their business in accord 
with PACA's prompt payment requirements. In particular, CHR 
challenges the Hull court's conclusion that a buyer who orally agrees to 
extend a payment term thereby makes an arrangement to violate PACA 
without the corresponding recognition that the seller necessarily makes 
the same arrangement. According to CHR, the sanction for sellers who 
make an arrangement to violate PACA by orally agreeing to an extended 
payment term is the forfeit of its trust benefits. We reject this argument 
for the reasons discussed above. 
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